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Modularity is a means of partitioning technical knowledge about a product or process. When state-
sanctioned intellectual property (IP) rights are ineffective or costly to enforce, modularity can be used to 
hide information and thus protect IP. We investigate the impact of modularity on IP protection by 
formally modeling the threat of expropriation by agents. The principal has three options to address this 
threat: trust, licensing, and paying agents to stay loyal. We show how the principal can influence the value 
of these options by modularizing the system and by hiring clans of agents, thus exploiting relationships 
among them. Extensions address screening and signaling in hiring, the effects of an imperfect legal 
system, and social norms of fairness. We illustrate our arguments with examples from practice. 
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Modularity and Intellectual Property Protection 
INTRODUCTION 
Modularity brings many technical and organizational benefits, including the division of labor, 
reduced cognitive complexity, and higher adaptability and evolvability (Simon, 1962; Garud and 
Kumaraswamy, 1995; Baldwin and Clark 2000; Schilling, 2000). Yet, despite these well-known technical 
benefits that support value creation, it is not always straightforward for firms to capture value and protect 
their intellectual property (IP) in a modular system. In fact, the increased threat to IP has been described 
explicitly as a drawback of modularity, to be balanced against its various potential benefits (Rivkin, 2000; 
Pil and Cohen, 2006; Ethiraj, Levinthal, and Roy, 2008). 
The risks that modularity poses to IP are illustrated by the history of IBM’s System/360, the first 
“truly modular” computer (Ferguson and Morris, 1993). Peripheral devices such as disk drives, tape 
drives, and printers could be added as modules to an existing system without difficulty. While customers 
valued this flexibility, soon after the introduction of System/360, many new firms making peripheral 
devices entered the market in competition with IBM. Importantly in our context, many of these firms 
were started by defecting IBM employees (Pugh et al., 1991).  
In other cases, however, modularity can help to protect IP, by splitting crucial knowledge into 
separate modules. Consider the following historical example. In the eighteenth century, Frederick 
Augustus II, Elector of Saxony, had maintained a monopoly on European porcelain by the simple 
expedient of imprisoning the inventor in a fortress in Meissen. When the inventor was close to death, 
Augustus ordered him to divide his knowledge between two successors. One man was told the formula 
for porcelain paste; the other learned the secrets of making porcelain glaze. Thus, after the inventor died, 
no one individual could replicate the entire Meissen porcelain-making process (Gleeson, 1998).   
In this paper, we will show that modularity can be used to protect IP by enabling companies to 
disperse and hide information that might otherwise be difficult to protect through the legal system. The 
relationship between organizational secrets and organization structure has been explored theoretically by MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
 
 
2
Liebeskind (1996, 1997), Rønde (2001) and Rajan and Zingales (2001). Our analysis builds on this prior 
work and goes beyond it in the following ways.  
First, we distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy types of agents. The presence of 
trustworthy agents in the population makes the option of “doing nothing”—i.e., banking on the possibility 
that there is no untrustworthy agent among the employees—relevant for the principal, in addition to ex-
ante licensing and setting up relational contracts. It also entails a discussion of screening and signaling in 
order to pick trustworthy agents. Second, we account for relationships among agents by analyzing “clans” 
in the sense defined by Ouchi (1980) as associations of individuals with common values and beliefs who 
thus act consistently in most circumstances. Clans may be hired by the principal or emerge through 
relationship-building within the focal firm. Third, in our analysis of modularity, we allow for different 
levels of complementarity among modules, and investigate how clans and modularity interact in 
determining the preferred organizational structure. Lastly, when clans or modules are asymmetric, our 
model—based on rational choice theory—indicates that members of larger clans and agents working on 
less valuable modules should be paid less. However, we argue, this strictly rational approach may be 
problematic when agents are socialized within relationships to value reciprocity and fairness. 
Our main results are the following. For the base case of a one-module system, “doing nothing” is the 
best option for protecting the principal’s IP if the percentage of trustworthy agents in the population is 
high. Ex-ante licensing is optimal if the percentage of trustworthy agents is low, and the intensity of 
competition in duopoly is also low (so that the license is valuable). Establishing relational contracts with 
agents (i.e., paying them above their efficiency wage not to defect) dominates both doing nothing and ex 
ante licensing if the intensity of competition is high, the number of agents is low, and the percentage of 
trustworthy agents is below a threshold. Finally, a decline in the number of agents needed to perform the 
focal tasks increases the range of parameter values for which doing nothing or a relational contract is 
preferred to licensing.  MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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Hiring clans of agents, or promoting their emergence among employees, is a way for the principal to 
mitigate the risk of expropriation. Assuming that all members of a clan act together, the presence of clans 
in effect reduces the number of independently acting agents among the employees. This makes both doing 
nothing and a relational contract more attractive relative to licensing.  
Modularizing the focal technical system has similar effects to hiring clans. Each module has fewer 
agents than the whole system and is worth less, hence doing nothing and relational contracts increase in 
value relative to licensing. This effect increases as modules exhibit higher levels of complementarity. In 
this context, we carve out the important distinction between modularity in use and modularity in 
production and design. While the former facilitates imitation and substitution (Rivkin, 2000; Pil and 
Cohen, 2006; Ethiraj, Levinthal, and Roy, 2008), the latter mitigates the risk of imitation by agents.   
Clans and modularity interact in an important way. As long as all members of a clan work on the 
same module, their protective effects against expropriation reinforce each other. But if members of a clan 
are spread across modules and can share their knowledge, then clan members will have access to 
knowledge that module boundaries could have kept hidden from them. In that case, clans partly defeat the 
protective effect of modularity.   
When clans or modules are asymmetric, our model—based on rational choice theory—indicates that 
members of larger clans and agents working on less valuable modules should be paid less. Also cohorts of 
new hires that, due to improved screening or signaling technology, have a higher share of trustworthy 
agents may receive lower payments. We shall argue, however, that the use of rational choice theory to 
predict agents’ behavior may not be appropriate if agents value relationships characterized by reciprocity 
and fairness. 
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the relevant literature. We then 
begin our formal analysis by introducing and analyzing the base case of a one-module system. We 
analyze the impact of clans and go on to study the impact of modularity and its interaction with clans. 
After discussing several extensions of our analysis, we provide illustrative examples from practice. We MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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conclude the paper by describing the limitations of our analysis, implications for scholars and managers, 
and directions for future work. 
BACKGROUND 
Knowledge may be a source of profits and competitive advantage, so long as it cannot be 
expropriated, imitated, or substituted (Teece, 1986, 2000; Barney, 1991). IP rights may protect against 
expropriation and imitation, but vary in strength by jurisdiction and industry (Maskus, 2000; Zhao, 2006; 
Kyle and McGahan, 2009; Branstetter et al., 2011). When formal IP rights are weak, relational contracts 
may afford protection against expropriation. As we will show, they may be particularly effective in 
conjunction with modularity. In this section, we review the relevant strands of literature. 
Relational Contracts in Economics, Law and Sociology 
 The economic theory of the firm is concerned with the location of boundaries between companies 
(Coase, 1937). Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) developed a theory of the firm 
based on optimal allocation of property rights. Brynjolfsson (1994) applied their reasoning to knowledge 
and intellectual property. We follow Brynjolfsson in focusing on knowledge as an asset, and we follow 
Hart and Moore (1990) in defining “property” as the ability to exclude others from using the asset. We 
differ from these prior works, however, in that we do not consider property rights to be secure.  
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) extended Grossman, Hart, and Moore’s theoretical framework to 
include so-called “relational contracts.” In a relational contract, deviations from cooperative behavior can 
be punished by terminating the relationship. As long as the reward to deviation is less than the 
continuation value of the relationship, parties to the contract will cooperate without state enforcement 
(Kreps, 1990; Greif, 1998; Gibbons and Henderson, 2012). Relational contracts are thus self-enforcing 
(Telser, 1980; Baldwin, 1983; Greif, 1998). They can be modeled as repeated games (Bull, 1987; Kreps, 
1990; Baker et al., 2002). In practice, they take different forms including unilateral contractual payments, 
bilateral contractual payments and equity-based alliances (Oxley, 1997).  MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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It should be noted that the concept of relational contract in economics differs from that in law and 
sociology. In law, for example, Macneil (1978, 1985) defines relational contracts as associations that have 
significant duration and involve close personal relationships, with “entangling strings of friendship, 
reputation, interdependence, morality, and altruistic desires” (Macneil, 1987, p. 276). In contrast, in 
economics and game theory, agents are assumed to be purely calculative about a continuing relationship, 
that is, they constantly ask the question “is it worthwhile for me to stay in this relationship or not?” 
(Williamson, 1993). In what follows, we use the term “relational contract” as in economics and game 
theory, to mean a self-enforcing agreement between self-interested, value-maximizing agents. 
However, the difference in perspectives leads to different interpretations of the concept of “trust” 
which is a central focus of our analysis. Scholars in sociology, for example, Granovetter (1985), define 
trust as the expectation of non-calculative, benign action by another agent, and see it arising from a 
combination of embeddedness in social networks and repeated personal interaction (Uzzi, 1997). Dyer 
and Singh (1998) argue that informal safeguards based on trust generate greater “relational rents” than 
formal safeguards, but empirical support of this contention is mixed at best (Sako, 1998). Taking the 
economic perspective, Williamson (1993, pp. 475-479) acknowledges that trustworthy behavior in 
commercial relationships can be elicited by environmental conditions, including embeddedness in social 
networks and cultural norms and expectations. But, he argues, such actions flow from agents’ calculations 
of long-term self-interest. Supporting this point of view, there is evidence that transaction hazards (i.e., 
temptations) increase the probability of untrustworthy behavior (Poppo, Zhou and Zenger, 2008). But 
there is also countervailing evidence from psychology that cost-benefit analysis does not affect dishonest 
behavior (Mazar, Amir and Ariely, 2008).   
In general it is impossible to infer from actions alone whether a given agent’s trustworthy behavior is 
motivated by calculations of long-term interest, concerns about social sanctions, personal integrity, or a 
combination of these factors (Posner, 2002; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). However, there is observable 
variation in behavior across individuals and populations. Rotter (1980) presents evidence that some MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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individuals are innately more trusting and trustworthy than others. And the probability that trustworthy 
behavior arises from social norms and moral beliefs vs. direct payments varies across cultures and is 
sensitive to surrounding institutions (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994; Meier, 2006; Bjørnskov, 2007).  
Still one can never be 100% sure that the person one is dealing with is trustworthy—trust can always be 
abused (Granovetter, 1985).  
In our model, we distinguish between agents, called “trustworthy,” for whom social norms and moral 
beliefs are sufficient to prevent defection and agents, called “untrustworthy,” who require financial 
compensation not to defect. We allow the percentage of trustworthy and untrustworthy agents to vary 
across populations, and show how the focal firm will condition its strategy on this variable. We admit that 
this is a crude way to capture the subtle nuances of relationships in organizations, but we believe that 
deciding whether to trust (vs. pay) one’s agents is a true strategic choice for firms whose competitive 
advantage rests on protecting organizational secrets.  
Organizational Secrets and the Problem of Expropriation 
In a seminal paper, Liebeskind (1997) opened up the topic of protecting organizational secrets by 
discussing the benefits and costs of keeping a firm’s unique knowledge safe from public view. She 
framed secrecy as an economic tradeoff, and discussed various methods used by firms to protect their 
secrets. Rønde (2001) then constructed a formal model in which a principal, who needs to grant agents 
access to his knowledge in order to commercialize it, fears that they will expropriate it. (Rønde’s agents 
are strictly calculative.) The principal can either grant all agents full access, or divide the task at hand and 
provide to each agent only the information she needs for her task.  
Rajan and Zingales (2001) analyze how a principal can contain the risk of knowledge expropriation 
through the firm’s hierarchical structure and size. In a vertical hierarchy, agents on lower levels are 
assumed to have limited access to the principal’s knowledge due to their larger distance from the 
knowledge source and specialization to their direct superiors. This specialization and the resulting loyalty MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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drive the result that physical-capital-intensive industries should be characterized by steep hierarchies, 
while in human-capital-intensive industries flat hierarchies should prevail. 
Finally, the idea of dividing knowledge in order to capture more of its value figures in Anton and 
Yao’s (2005) model of a sale of IP subject to Arrow’s (1962) information paradox. They suggest splitting 
the knowledge in such a way that one part is protectable and informative about the value of the IP overall, 
and selling this part first. They find this approach to be more profitable for the seller than a bundled sale 
of both parts.  
Clans 
One possibility for the principal to protect his knowledge from expropriation is to employ agents 
who defect, or stay on, in groups. Ouchi (1980) defines a “clan” as an association of individuals who have 
been socialized to have common values and beliefs and thus act consistently in most circumstances. Clan 
members who deviate may also be punished in some fashion, for example by loss of access to the clan, 
ostracism, or shunning. A clan “resembles a kinship network but may not include blood relations” (Ouchi, 
1980: 134).  
The focus of Ouchi’s (1980) and most subsequent work in this context is on clan control of a firm as 
an alternative to market or bureaucratic control mechanisms. The firm’s employees, effectively, constitute 
the clan. However, the clan may also be a subset of the firm’s employees. In that case, the clan’s goals 
can be incongruent to those of the firm, as for example in Johnson et al.’s (2002) study of international 
joint ventures or Groysberg and Abrahams’ (2006) analysis of “liftouts” (defined as the hiring away of 
whole organizational units or teams). Indeed, teams whose members work closely together may become 
embedded in their own social network and thus develop the characteristics of a clan—more precisely, a 
“social-integrative clan” in the nomenclature of Alvesson and Lindkvist (1993). Alternatively, the 
principal may hire clans defined by e.g. nationality or family ties.  
As we will show, employing clans can both aggravate and mitigate the threat of expropriation of 
knowledge. As a means of protection it is most effective in conjunction with modularity.   MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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Modularity 
According to the theory of modularity, firms can divide complex technical systems into components 
(“modules”) that can be designed independently but function together as a whole. Three key concepts are 
worth noting. First, the modular structure of a technical system is a choice that system architects make 
(von Hippel, 1990; Ulrich and Eppinger, 1994; Baldwin and Clark, 2000).  Most complex technical 
systems can be designed to be more or less modular, and the boundaries between modules can be located 
in different places (Mead and Conway, 1980; Ulrich and Eppinger, 1994). Second, if the separation of 
modules is done properly, the design decisions taken with respect to one module will not affect decisions 
taken in other modules. Design tasks can then be allocated to different organizational units or firms (von 
Hippel, 1990; Langlois and Robertson, 1992; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996). Third, just as modules can be 
separated in terms of their underlying design decisions, knowledge about modules can likewise be 
separated. As long as they can access the design rules specifying the interfaces, Module A’s designers do 
not need to have specific knowledge about Module B’s internal structure. Thus the designers of each 
module have (potentially) exclusive knowledge. Conversely, designers working within a module must 
share knowledge or risk jeopardizing the success of their efforts. 
While the technological and organizational consequences of modularity have received a great deal of 
scholarly attention, the strategic consequences—i.e., how modularity affects competition among firms—
have been studied less widely. Rivkin (2000), Pil and Cohen (2006) and Ethiraj, Levinthal, and Roy 
(2008) argue that modularity poses a strategic trade-off for innovators. On the positive side, it allows the 
focal firm to innovate faster and thus stay ahead of would-be imitators. Further advantages, given inter-
firm compatibility, may be the chance to mix and match modules from different sellers (Matutes and 
Regibeau, 1988) and to upgrade individual modules selectively (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1995). An 
innovator may even invite competitive entry through modularity in order to promote a market segment as 
a whole (Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993).  On the negative side, modularity makes a firm’s products 
easier to imitate (Rivkin, 2000; Pil and Cohen, 2006; Ethiraj, Levinthal, and Roy, 2008). In this paper, we MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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add to this prior work by looking at how modularity affects the threat of expropriation of IP, and carve out 
the important distinction between modularity in production (which partitions and thus can protect 
organizational knowledge) and modularity in use (which exposes the firm to external competition on 
modules). 
THE BASE CASE: PROTECTING KNOWLEDGE IN ONE-MODULE SYSTEMS 
When someone possesses knowledge and wants to realize its value, he must generally employ 
individuals and contract with suppliers who will turn that knowledge into a working product or process. 
But in doing so, the principal must (almost always) reveal that information to those agents, subject to the 
modular division of the system. Those agents, in turn, could set up a rival establishment or reveal the 
knowledge to competitors (for clarity of exposition, we focus on the first possibility). This threat is well-
known in law and economics and has been discussed by Teece (1986), Liebeskind (1997), Rønde (2001), 
and Rajan and Zingales (2001). Organizational knowledge may be protected via trade secrets law and 
non-disclosure agreements, but such protection is imperfect and its effectiveness varies by jurisdiction 
(Sherwood 1990; Oxley, 1999; Fisk, 2001; Lemley 2008; Marx 2011).  
Model set-up 
We first consider the simplest case: a one-module system, in which each design decision is related to 
all others. Thus, people working on the module must have unrestricted access to all relevant knowledge in 
order to address the system’s interdependencies. This leaves the principal vulnerable especially when, as 
we assume, property rights or contracts over knowledge are not enforceable within the governing legal 
system.  
Let the total number of agents who need access to the principal’s knowledge be denoted by N. The 
agents fall into two types. The first type, called “trustworthy,” will under no circumstances defect. The 
second type, called “untrustworthy,” will defect if it is in their economic interest to do so. Each agent 
knows his or her own type, but not the types of the other agents. The probability, t, that any given agent is MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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trustworthy is known to both the principal and all agents. We model t as exogenous for the time being. 
We assume that untrustworthy agents decide independently whether to defect or not.
3 Apart from not 
knowing the other agents’ types, all agents have full information about the parameters and the structure of 
the game.
4  
To keep the analysis tractable and focused on our aim of studying the impact of relationships and 
modularity, we assume that only two firms can profitably operate in the market.
5 We define V as the value 
of the monopoly, and    as the net value, per firm, of duopoly. A defecting agent who successfully sets 
up a rival firm appropriates   .
6 Finally, we assume that 0  2V V  ; otherwise an efficient principal 
would want to create a second establishment of his own accord. In general, V can be ex ante uncertain, in 
which case  corresponds to a proportionate equity share in the monopoly. There may be reasons to 
prefer one form of relational contract (e.g. an equity alliance) to others, but in general, those concerns lie 
outside the scope of our model (cf. Oxley, 1997, 1999 for an analysis of different contract forms). 
The principal’s options 
In dealing with the risk of defection the principal has three options: to do nothing and bank on the 
possibility that all his agents are trustworthy; to license his technology to the highest bidder before hiring 
agents; and to enter into relational contracts with his agents. We analyze each in turn and then determine 
                                                      
 
3  The timing of moves is as follows. Each period is divided into two sub-periods. In the first sub-period, agents 
simultaneously and independently decide whether to defect and the defectors leave. In the second sub-period, the principal learns 
if any have defected and pays the agents accordingly. The defectors, if any, collect and split their reward. Then, conditional on no 
defections, the game is repeated. There is no last period of the game, although it may end probabilistically as a result of 
exogenous events. 
4 In his analysis of social norms, Posner (2002) makes similar assumptions about the existence of trustworthy (cooperative) 
and untrustworthy (uncooperative) agents. He then considers how cooperative agents use conformance with social norms to 
credibly signal their type. Below we address the principal’s and agents’ incentives to invest in better screening or signaling 
technology, which would help them to increase t among the principal’s employees. For now, though, we treat t as exogenous. 
5  The general case is extremely complicated because the payments necessary to keep untrustworthy agents loyal are 
determined recursively. Depending on the exogenous value of a k-firm oligopoly vs. a k+1-firm oligopoly, and the fixed cost of 
setting up a new firm, an intricate sequence of endogenous agent payments can be found through backward induction. The 
sequence is not necessarily monotonic. 
6 Also when joining an existing competitor, the defecting agent may be able to appropriate the entire value of   , e.g., if 
several existing firms compete for her knowledge.  MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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the principal’s best option. For simplicity, we assume all parties are risk neutral, although this assumption 
is not essential to the results. 
Doing nothing, licensing 
If the principal “does nothing,” then his monopoly is preserved if and only if all N of his agents are 
trustworthy, which happens with probability t
N. His expected payoff then is 
  Πnothing          1        .  (1) 
Note that the value of doing nothing declines as N, the number of agents goes up. In effect, each 
additional agent “in the know” increases the probability that one of them will be untrustworthy. 
Alternatively, the principal can, before hiring agents, forgo his monopoly, and license his technology 
to the highest bidder who will then set up a second competing establishment. By our simplifying 
assumption that only two firms can profitably operate in the market, the existence of the second 
establishment makes defection unattractive to agents at both establishments. Assuming more than one 
bidder and Bertrand competition, we obtain as the value of this option: 
  Πlicensing  2      .   (2) 
Relational contracts  
As a third option, the principal can set up a self-enforcing relational contract with the agents. 
Following common practice in economics, we model a relational contract between a principal and his 
agents as a repeated game in which the principal essentially pays the agents not to defect (Bull 1987; 
Baker et al. 2002).  MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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To set up a relational contract with calculative agents, the principal promises to pay each agent a 
bonus above the competitive wage with a present value of V  if nobody defects and zero otherwise.
7 The 
minimum bonus is affected by the principal’s need to make the contract self-enforcing. Specifically, if 
    then loyalty by all (untrustworthy) agents cannot be an equilibrium since each can do better by 
defecting. 
To fully specify the game, we must describe what the untrustworthy agents expect to happen when 
two or more defect. One possibility is that each defector immediately builds a new establishment. Since 
by assumption, only two establishments profitably operate, the defectors will all incur losses. The game 
among agents is essentially a game of “chicken,” and the unique Nash equilibrium (if   ) is for one 
and only one agent to defect. Alternatively, potential defectors might expect to come together and split the 
value of the second establishment amongst themselves. With   , all untrustworthy agents will defect 
(since agent payments for those who stay will go down to zero after defection of one or more others). This 
game is essentially a prisoner’s dilemma (or social dilemma). Each agent gains at the margin by 
defecting, but in aggregate the defectors are worse off than if they had been loyal.  
Interestingly, from the principal’s standpoint the design of the relational contract does not depend on 
the agents’ conjectures about the behavior of other agents. Whether the game is chicken or a prisoner’s 
dilemma, if   , then each Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is characterized by one or more 
untrustworthy agents defecting.  And one defection suffices to end the principal’s monopoly.  
Thus, to bring about an “all stay” equilibrium, the principal must set     , paying every 
untrustworthy agent an amount whose value is equal to the total defection reward, V. And because (by 
assumption) the principal cannot distinguish between untrustworthy and trustworthy agents, all agents 
                                                      
 
7 To keep notation simple, we assume that agents live forever. Assuming, instead, a constant probability of dying in each 
period would keep our results qualitatively unchanged.  MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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must receive a stream of payments whose value equals V. Thus the total cost of protecting the 
principal’s knowledge against unauthorized use by agents is NV and the value of this option is:  
  Πpayments    1         1        . (3) 
The principal’s best option 
We start by comparing “doing nothing” to licensing. It is straightforward to show that for low values 
of t (an untrustworthy population), the principal will choose licensing, while for high values of t, he will 
hope to preserve the monopoly and do nothing. The following proposition provides more detailed results. 
All proofs are in the Appendix. 
Proposition 1 (a) For a one-module system, if (1) property rights and contracts are not enforceable; 
(2) the principal cannot distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy agents; and (3) the 
defection reward (equivalent to the licensing payment) is V , then the principal should opt to 
license his knowledge if the percentage of trustworthy agents: 
 
  t  t
† 

1

 

 
1/N
 ; (4) 
The principal should do nothing if  t > t
†, and is indifferent if t = t
†. 
 
(b) The threshold value t
† increases in both  and N. 
We now compare the payoff obtainable using relational contracts (Equation 3) to those from doing 
nothing and licensing (Equations 1 and 2 respectively). This leads to: 
Proposition 2 (a). Under the same assumptions as Proposition 1, the principal can achieve an “all-
stay” equilibrium in a relational contract by paying each agent an annuity whose present value, 
denoted V , equals the total defection reward V .  
 
(b) Setting up a relational contract is the best policy for the principal if two conditions hold: 
 
  N 
1 2 ;    and   t  t
*  1
N
1

 

 
1/N
 (5) 
 
If either condition is violated, then one of the other options (do nothing or licensing) is preferable. 
  
(c) The threshold value t
* decreases in both  and N.  
 MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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To see how parameter changes affect the principal’s best option, we calculated for each pair of 
options under which conditions one is equal or superior to the other. Solving the resulting conditions for 
, we obtain: 
  Πnothing  Π payments	⇔	  
    
          
  Πnothing  Π licensing	⇔	  
  
       (6)  
  Πpayments  Π licensing	⇔	  
 
     
Figure 1 shows the (t,) parameter space for N=1 and N=5.
8 We can divide the parameter space into 
three regions defined by the principal’s respective best option. In Region L, licensing is optimal; in 
Region N, doing nothing; and in Region P, paying agents. The subscript of each label indicates which 
option is second-best. For continuity reasons, the first-best option in a given sub-region is second-best in 
the neighboring sub-region. For example in sub-region LP, licensing is first-best and payments are 
second-best, while in the adjacent sub-region PL, payments are first-best and licensing is second-best. 
We now establish a basic result that will be useful when we incorporate clan relationships and 
modularity into the analysis. From Equations 1, 2, and 3, it is clear that reducing N, the number of agents, 
increases the value of doing nothing and agent payments, while having no effect on the value of licensing. 
Since the value of each option increases weakly as N decreases, the maximum of these values also 
increases weakly. We summarize:  
Proposition 3. Other things equal, a decline in the number of agents N is either beneficial or value-
neutral for the principal. With declining N, the region in (t,) parameter space in which licensing is 
optimal shrinks, while the other two regions expand.  
 
In the following sections, we show that employing clans and modularizing the product architecture 
each have the same effect as reducing N.  
                                                      
 
8 Note that, even in large firms, the relevant number N of agents with access to the principal’s knowledge may be quite low.  MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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Relationships among agents: Clans 
By definition, members of the same clan act together. We can thus assume that the clan follows its 
leader (or, if it does not have one specific leader, behaves as if it had one), and so the probability that any 
given clan is trustworthy equals the probability t that its leader is trustworthy. The definition implies that 
individuals in clans can coordinate their actions. 
Suppose the N agents are divided into L “clans” of size N/L, 1  L  N. Necessarily, N and L are both 
integers: the fractional parts of N/L can be interpreted as agents who work part-time. L=N is the condition 
where each agent acts as an individual, L=1 is the condition where all agents belong to the same clan. We 
assume that defecting clans will split the reward to defection equally amongst all members of the clan
9, 
and restrict the analysis for simplicity to clans of equal size (we will address the asymmetric case below 
in our discussion of fairness). 
Under these assumptions, employing L clans is mathematically equivalent to employing L agents, 
while keeping parameters t and    the same. Each clan behaves as a single decision-maker and each can 
expect a total defection reward equal to α . Thus, the value of doing nothing becomes: Πnothing,	clans  
	       1       ∙ ; the value of licensing is unchanged; and the value of the agent payment strategy 
becomes: Πpayment,	clans  	 1       ∙ .  
We can now apply Proposition 3. Since L < N, employing clans makes both agent payments and 
doing nothing more attractive relative to licensing. In the (t,)  parameter space, Regions N and P 
expand while Region L must shrink. If the principal starts and ends the day in Region L, then employing 
clans is value-neutral. In contrast, if, with clans, the principal ends the day in Region N or Region P, then 
he is unambiguously better off employing clans vs. employing individualistic agents.  
                                                      
 
9 If the clan is hierarchical, such that higher-ranking members are paid more than lower-ranking members, we assume the 
payments will be similarly apportioned, if the clan defects or does not defect. MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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THE IMPACT OF MODULARITY 
The option to hire agents linked by clanship may or may not be available to the principal. However, 
he has full control over the design of the system subject to technological constraints. In particular, he can 
design the system in a modular fashion and thus divide the relevant knowledge into separate modules. 
Importantly, we assume that the principal either sells only complete systems rather than individual 
modules (Fixson and Park, 2008), or is able to protect the system’s interfaces such that no third party 
products can be attached to the principal’s system.  
Modeling modules and complementarity 
To start with, consider the simplest case: a symmetric split of the system into M modules, each worth 
V/M. Assume that, as with the entire system, only one competing establishment can be profitably set up 
for each module. A defecting agent secures the reward V/M, which is also the principal’s duopoly payoff 
from that module. In this situation, the principal’s payoffs under the three strategies are given by 
Equations 1 – 3 above, with N replaced by N/M. Also, V is replaced by V/M and the entire equation 
multiplied by M: the latter two Ms cancel each other out, leaving only N/M in place of N. Thus, this type 
of modularization has the same effect as reducing the number of agents. By Proposition 3, it is beneficial 
or neutral for the principal. 
We now relax the assumption that the overall value of the system is the additive sum of the modules’ 
value. To simplify the analysis and reduce the vast number of combinatorial possibilities, we assume 
there are two types of defection rewards: a module reward that can be claimed by defectors of any 
module, and a system reward that can only be claimed if there is a defector in each module. We further 
assume that the total defection reward for a system of M modules can be expressed as a convex linear 
combination of the two types: 
  Total Defection Reward 	≡  1    ∑   
 
     
  
   	    ∏   
 
         ,              (7) MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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where    is a number between 0 and 1, and i equals 1 if at least one agent from module i defected, 
otherwise 0.
10 Thus module defectors can claim a reward equal to  1     /  for their own module, 
and in addition, if every module has a defector, the defectors as a group can claim the system reward 
equal to    . Notice that, with M=1, the total defection reward equals V  even with only one defector. 
Hence the one-module system previously analyzed is subsumed in this broader specification.  
In Equation 7,   is a parameter that allows us to “tune” the degree to which modules are 
complementary. If   0 , then each module has a separate stand-alone value V/M, and the defectors’ 
total reward is simply the sum of module rewards. In contrast, if   1 , the modules are strict 
complements, and all must be present for the defectors to realize any reward at all. For   between zero 
and one, the modules have some stand-alone value, but there is additional value derived from putting all 
the pieces together. 
Doing nothing, licensing 
We start, again, by analyzing the options of “doing nothing” and licensing. In the modular system, 
the value of doing nothing equals the expected value of each module times the number of modules plus 
the incremental value of the system. In the proof to Proposition 4 we show that, for 0 < t <1, the payoff 
Πnothing,	mod is strictly greater than Πnothing and increasing in both the number of modules, M, and the 
degree of complementarity,  .  
If the principal licenses all modules, he will get V  in total for the license and his own 
establishment will be worth the same. Thus the aggregate payoff to licensing is not changed by 
modularization. 
Relational contracts 
                                                      
 
10 For simplicity, we again assume modules are symmetric. Assuming different stand-alone values would simply add another 
parameter to each term in the summation, but there is no insight to be gained from the added complexity. MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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We next analyze the value of setting up relational contracts in a modular system. To calculate this 
value, we first determine the expected defection reward per agent within each module, assuming that 
defectors split the system reward (if any) evenly between modules. The agents within a module are in the 
same prisoners’ dilemma or “chicken” situation discussed earlier. In contrast, defectors across modules 
are not in a prisoner’s dilemma game: each one hopes that agents in other modules will defect. Thus, the 
necessary payment to keep each agent in a module loyal is:   
  V  Expected Defection Reward per agent   		  1         	  / .   (8) 
where p denotes the probability that there is at least one defector in every module group.
11 This payment 
is strictly decreasing in the number of modules, and, if   1 , in the system’s degree of complementarity. 
We summarize our results in the following Proposition.  
Proposition 4. When the system is symmetrically split into M modules, with  measuring the degree 
of complementarity between them, then if the share of trustworthy agents is positive and less than 
one (0 < t < 1), the values of the principal’s various options change as follows.  
 
(a) The values of doing nothing and of paying agents increase strictly in M, the number of modules.  
(b) These values also increase strictly in , the degree of complementarity. 
(c)  The value of licensing remains unchanged. 
 
Proposition 4 applies within the bounds 0 < t < 1. If t =1 (everyone is trustworthy), then the strategy 
of doing nothing is trivially optimal and its value is invariant to both modularity and complementarity. If t 
= 0 (no one is trustworthy), then licensing is better than doing nothing, and is also invariant to modularity 
and complementarity. However, the strategy of agent payments may dominate licensing in this case. (If t 
                                                      
 
11 By definition, p is the probability that there is at least one untrustworthy agent in each module. If the expected defection 
reward per module exceeds agent payments, then at least one untrustworthy agent per module will defect (if there is one) and p 
equals the probability that there is at least one defector in each module. If agent payments exceed the module-level reward, (1-β) 
αV/M, but not the total expected defection reward per module, then agents across modules are in a coordination game: it pays to 
defect (for one agent per module at least) if, and only if, one or more agents from each other module defect. We assume that the 
principal expects agents to coordinate successfully, in which case, again, p equals the probability that at least one agent per 
module will defect.  MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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= 0, the value of the agent payment strategy is strictly increasing in the number of modules and invariant 
to complementarity.) 
Thus, in parallel with clans, when modularity is introduced, Region L in the (t,) parameter space 
shrinks while the other two regions (N and P) expand. If, after modularization, the (t,) combination lies 
in Regions N or P, then modularity unambiguously improves the outcome for the principal. Furthermore, 
as long as some agents are trustworthy, the effect is larger the greater the level of complementarity 
between modules. 
We note that in a modular system, the principal could also apply hybrid strategies, i.e., treat 
individual modules differently. Analyzing such strategies in full generality is a rather complex exercise, 
which we omit in the interest of simplicity. For specific cases, we can show that hybrid strategies are 
inferior to one of the non-hybrid strategies, and the argument provides some indication that a hybrid 
strategy may never be optimal.
12 
Modularity with Clans 
It is possible to have clans within a modular system. Recall that by definition, all members of a clan 
do the same thing: they either defect or they stay with the principal. We also assume that the principal 
knows the clan structure of his agents and can assign clan members to modules based on this knowledge. 
We assume there are L clans and the number of modules M is controlled by the principal. To begin with, 
for simplicity, we also assume that L =M, i.e., clan size and module size are matched. (This situation may 
arise, for example, when a team develops characteristics of a clan through working closely together on 
one module.)  
                                                      
 
12 A specific hybrid strategy is for the principal to pay agents in Module 1 not to defect, and do nothing for all other 
modules. For strong complementarity (  close to  1), Module 1 becomes essential for profitable defection (so do all other 
modules, but those agents do not lose agent payments when they defect). Thus, even if there are defectors in the other modules 
this would only cause a minor loss (proportional to 1-) to the principal if he can keep the agents in Module 1 loyal. However, by 
the same token these agents will be able to negotiate a large share of the system-level defection reward. This effect vitiates—
partly or even entirely, depending on the precise assumptions—the principal’s gains from having to pay only N/M instead of N 
agents.  Under specific assumptions, one can show that paying agents in Module 1 only is inferior either to doing nothing or to 
symmetric agent payments for =0, and inferior to the latter for =1.  MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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It is straightforward to show that the principal benefits from having all members of the same clan 
work on the same module. Clans, we have said, effectively reduce the number of independent decision-
makers, which increases the value of the do–nothing strategy. They also reduce the per-person defection 
reward, thus increasing the value of the agent payment strategy. And they do not change the value of 
licensing. Hence, by the same reasoning used above, mapping clans onto modules increases the 
principal’s payoff relative to modularity or clans alone in Regions N and P, and is value-neutral in Region 
L (where modularity and clans have no value anyway). 
In contrast, if members of a clan are dispersed through the system, then an untrustworthy clan can be 
sure there is a willing defector in every module where one of its members works. The per-person payment 
needed to deter the clan’s defection goes up, causing the value of the agent payment strategy to go down. 
The value of doing nothing also declines compared to a situation without clans because the principal will 
face system-level competition with higher probability.  
Hybrid distributions of clan and non-clan members within and across modules change agents’ 
expected rewards and the value of doing nothing in complicated, but computable ways. Nevertheless, 
concentrating clan members within modules is always better for both the agent payment strategy and the 
do-nothing strategy than spreading clan members across the system. In effect, a dispersed clan de-
modularizes the system to some degree, because clan members can pool their knowledge about different 
modules and, if they defect, can recreate several modules or even the whole system. 
EXTENSIONS  
Our model can be extended in various respects. In this section, we discuss screening of agents and 
signaling by agents, legal protection of IP, imitation and substitution by third parties, value-increasing 
modularity, and fairness. We refrain from modeling these extensions formally in order to limit the 
complexity of the analysis, and instead provide a qualitative discussion of each issue.  MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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Screening and signaling 
An agent’s prior exchange relationships may allow the principal to distinguish between trustworthy 
and untrustworthy agents, and may enable the agent to signal her type to the principal. If agents are 
otherwise identical and there is no scarcity of trustworthy agents in the labor market, then the principal 
will hire only those identified as trustworthy. If the selection mechanism works perfectly, then the 
problem is solved. However, this is unlikely. In identifying trustworthy agents there will generally be 
false positives (Granovetter, 1985). In that case, screening and signaling will serve to increase the share of 
trustworthy agents among the principal’s employees above t, the value in the population, though not to 
100 percent. Effectively, the t relevant to the principal’s decision increases. As a result, the relevant (t,) 
combination moves to the right in Figure 1, and the principal’s payoff increases with further increases in t 
as soon as Region N (“do-nothing”) is reached.  
In a modular system, increasing t improves not only the value of doing nothing, but also that of 
paying agents. In this domain, the trustworthiness of the population interacts with system 
complementarity in an interesting way. If all agents are untrustworthy (t = 0), then there is no difference 
between complementary modules and strictly additive modules. In contrast, if some agents are 
trustworthy (t > 0), then required agent payments decline as complementarity increases. A more 
trustworthy population decreases the probability that an agent from every module will defect, which in 
turn increases the probability that the “system value” will be captured by the principal. In effect, in 
Regions N and P, t and   are strict complements as defined by Milgrom and Roberts (1990): actions that 
increase t or   make actions that increase the other variable more valuable.
13 
The situation is more complex if the principal has reason to employ known untrustworthy agents 
(e.g., because trustworthy agents are scarce, or because he could identify them after hiring but is unable to 
                                                      
 
13 Within regions N and P, this fact can be demonstrated by simple calculus. If the principal switches regions, it follows 
from the fact that strict complementarity holds for the second-best strategy, hence must a fortiori hold for the first-best strategy. MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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lay them off), or if a superior screening technology obtains higher t for a new cohort of employees. In that 
case, rational choice theory may prescribe keeping the known untrustworthy agents (or the older cohort of 
employees, respectively) loyal through payments while doing nothing for the others. Again, this situation 
is perfectly amenable to analysis by our model. However, if agents learn about the differential treatment 
they may perceive it as unfair, an issue we discuss below. 
 The premise that trustworthy agents can be identified due to their prior exchange relationships has 
the additional implication that an agent’s behavior with the focal principal will affect her reputation, and 
hence her ability to achieve attractive wages in the future (e.g., Hannah, 2005). We can account for this 
effect in our model by reducing the payoff to defectors by a reputational penalty. As a result, the agent 
payment strategy becomes less costly, hence more attractive to the principal, while doing nothing and 
licensing remain unaffected. Thus, Region P in the parameter space expands while the other regions 
contract.    
Legal protection of intellectual property 
A perfect legal system would enable the principal to obtain and enforce intellectual property (IP) 
rights and contracts. However, although worldwide IP rights have been strengthened by the recent TRIPS 
agreement, they are still weakly enforced in many emerging economies (Kyle and McGahan, 2009; 
Branstetter et al., 2011). And even in developed economies, there is generally some uncertainty about the 
enforceability and scope of IP protection (Lemley and Shapiro, 2007). Furthermore, legal systems are 
costly to use. Thus, in both emerging and developed economies, payments under relational contracts and 
modularity can supplement state-sanctioned IP rights.  
In our model, legal protection of intellectual property would reduce the payoff to defection because 
of the possibility of legal sanctions such as fines or imprisonment.
14 Any reduction in defection rewards 
                                                      
 
14 In the U.S. theft of trade secrets is the only violation of intellectual property law that carries potential criminal sanctions. 
(Lemley, 2008). MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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makes the agent payment strategy more attractive, and a reduction that turns the reward negative makes 
“doing nothing” the best option. Laws that brand the expropriation of organizational secrets as theft (and 
thus a violation of social norms) can also increase t, making the do-nothing strategy more attractive. 
However, the value of licensing remains unchanged. Thus, as with the introduction of clans and 
modularity, a legal system that protects intellectual property expands Regions N and P at the expense of 
Region L.  
In the limit, with a perfect legal system, no agent perceives any benefit to defection and the do-
nothing strategy prevails everywhere in the parameter space. Licensing, clans, relational contracts, and 
modularity are all irrelevant in this (admittedly unrealistic) world. 
Imitation or substitution by third parties 
Imitation or substitution by third parties may also threaten the principal’s monopoly. If their identity 
is unknown, the principal cannot include such parties in any relational contract. But if imitation or 
substitution by external agents is likely, the value of the monopoly will decrease. While (rational) 
defection happens in the first stage of the repeated game or never, imitation or substitution occurs with 
some probability in every time period. And a legal system will protect the principal to some extent against 
imitation, but typically not against substitution (since IP rights generally cover the technical solution 
rather than the purpose of the system).  
Extending our model to address the possibilities of imitation and substitution leaves the value of 
licensing unchanged, since by assumption only two firms can profitably operate in the market. In contrast, 
the values of doing nothing and of paying agents go down, since the principal’s monopoly faces an 
additional (even if probabilistic) threat. Thus Region L expands, while Regions N and P shrink. 
Modularity plausibly increases the risk of imitation or substitution of individual modules (Rivkin, 
2000; Pil and Cohen, 2006; Ethiraj et al., 2008), an effect which has to be weighed against the protective 
effects of modularity against defection by agents. However, if would-be imitators or substitutors cannot 
attach their modules to the principal’s system, then they can only appropriate the stand-alone value, under MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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competition, of the respective module. Thus, an increase in the likelihood of module-level imitation or 
substitution is less detrimental for the principal the higher the degree of complementarity, . In effect, as 
long as the probability that at least one module remains under the principal’s exclusive control is positive, 
a higher degree of complementarity preserves more of the system value for the principal, thereby 
increasing the total value of the monopoly. We thus arrive at the important distinction between modularity 
in use, which increases the risk of imitation or substitution, and modularity in production, which mitigates 
the risk of expropriation by agents. 
Value-increasing modularity 
Modularization may increase system value and/or cause cost, two effects we have ignored so far. A 
value increase would affect both the value of monopoly and that of defection, and so could be addressed 
in our model, quite simply, by scaling the overall value, V. Similarly, a cost of modularization could be 
accounted for by a fixed cost term. Both changes would leave the mechanics and results of our model 
qualitatively unaffected. 
Notice, however, that if the value of the monopoly, V, increases, then the dollar value of defection 
rewards increases as well. To counterbalance the higher rewards, agent payments must go up in absolute 
terms. In other words, a value-increasing modularization can have the effect of disequilibrating pre-
existing relational contracts, unless the principal adjusts agent payments to reflect the new, higher value 
of the system. We will return to this point in our discussion of System/360 below. 
Fairness  
In designing a relational contract, rational choice theory recommends paying different groups of 
employees differently if they differ in terms of their share of trustworthy agents or the value of the 
module they are working on. The same recommendation arises if the principal employs clans of different 
sizes or a mixture of clans and individual agents. In our model, members of larger clans would be paid 
less than those in smaller clans, and any clan member would be paid less than an individual.  MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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However, agent behavior may not be fully consistent with rational choice theory. This is particularly 
so for clans which are, by definition, groups of individuals who are socialized to obey the clan’s norms 
(Ouchi, 1980, p. 132). Two very common norms, both borne out in laboratory experiments, are the norms 
of fairness and reciprocity. For example when humans play an “ultimatum” game against other humans, 
second movers regularly reject offers that they deem unfair. Players will punish someone who is unfair to 
them, even if it is against their immediate interest to do so, a behavior known as negative reciprocity 
(Prasnikar and Roth, 1992; Gächter and Fehr, 2002).  
If agents’ efforts and skill levels are the same, then paying some agents more than others is patently 
unfair. Thus, even though it may be rational and consistent with the Nash equilibrium to set up 
differential payments to prevent defection, the principal takes risks by doing so. Perceived unfairness can 
set in motion retaliatory strategies that are not individually or collectively rational. Individuals or clans 
might defect even though it is to their own loss.  
That said, agents are not entirely irrational either. They will accept a certain level of perceived 
unfairness if it is in their own or their clan’s interest. The principal can also take care that differential 
payments remain confidential (a common policy in many firms), or can justify them via organizational 
boundaries or nominally different job assignments.  
EXAMPLES 
In this section, we offer examples from practice that may help to clarify the assumptions, results, and 
limitations of our model. We begin with cases in which relational contracts and/or clans have been used to 
encourage loyalty and thus protect organizational secrets. We then discuss cases in which modularity, in 
conjunction with complementarity, has been used for this purpose. Our last example describes a value-
creating modularization that upset the pre-existing relational contract between company and employees 
and triggered a large number of employee defections. MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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Relational Contracts, Clans, Screening and Signaling 
Du Pont 
In the United States in the 19
th Century, the law regarding trade secrets protected documents and 
equipment, but not the knowledge in the heads of departing employees. Some employers did not hesitate 
to use relational contracts to ensure loyalty. For example, Massachusetts mill owner, Samuel Slater, paid 
his key employees higher wages to prevent their “aiding and assisting another mill” (Fisk, 2001, p. 467). 
Not all mill owners were eager to use this practice, however. For example, in the early 19
th Century, 
Irenee Du Pont founded an eponymous company to make gunpowder using secret formulas. The Du 
Ponts guarded their gunpowder secrets well. Through much of the 19
th Century, all research was 
conducted by senior family members assisted by their sons and nephews (Chandler and Salsbury, 1971). 
However, workers at Du Pont mills also had valuable knowledge about powder-making processes and 
thus other mill owners sometimes tried to lure them away with offers of higher wages (Fisk, 2001). 
Notably Du Pont did not try to match these outside offers. He was very conscious of the high cost of 
paying all workers their defection reward, writing to another mill owner, “More than twenty other hands 
who … possess as much information as the ones you wish to bribe must naturally suppose they ought to 
receive the same exorbitant wages” (ibid., p. 475). 
In terms of our model, Du Pont preferred “doing nothing” to setting up a relational contract with his 
workers. However, there is indirect evidence that he relied in part on the embeddedness of his workers in 
kinship groups and communities that may have functioned as clans. Du Pont family members and their 
workers lived and worked side-by-side in relatively remote communities.
15 A defector from the company 
perforce would have to leave his home, friends and extended family behind. He would suffer the 
condemnation not only of the Du Ponts, but of his fellow workers who remained loyal to the firm. 
                                                      
 
15 One does not locate gunpowder factories in the middle of cities. MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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Liftouts 
Within organizations, people who work closely together may develop close social ties. For example, 
it is not uncommon for individuals to stay in an organization despite financially attractive outside offers 
because of their strong sense of loyalty towards colleagues, co-workers, and bosses. It is also possible for 
a group of employees with close ties to leave as one body. For example, when John Merriwether left 
Salomon Brothers, six other managing directors followed, to become partners in Merriwether’s new firm, 
LTCM (Lowenstein, 2000).  
The hiring away of an organizational unit or team is known as a “liftout.” According to Groysberg 
and Abrahams (2006), liftouts are common in knowledge-based service businesses. A team that already 
knows how to work together can deliver better performance sooner than an equally skilled group of 
unconnected individuals. Such teams generally have common beliefs and mutually supportive social 
interactions. Whether they stay or leave the company, they act “as one” for the benefit of the group.  Thus 
they conform to Ouchi’s definition of a clan. 
Modularity 
We turn now to cases where modularity, in conjunction with complementarity, has been used to 
protect intellectual property. 
Porcelain 
In the introduction of this paper we described how Elector Frederick Augustus of Saxony used 
modularity to maintain a monopoly on European porcelain.
16 Augustus had to rely on one and later two 
agents—the inventor and his successors, respectively—to direct the porcelain-making process. Ironically, 
he could not rely on law—his law—to enforce intellectual property rights: a defector had only to ride as 
                                                      
 
16  Augustus’ motivations in owning a porcelain factory were complex. As a monarch, he maintained a large personal 
collection of porcelain objects and took the best and most ambitious pieces for himself. He also used the factory as a source of 
revenue. Both as a collector and as the sole owner of the factory, he was eager to maintain a monopoly over the porcelain-making 
process in Europe (Gleeson, 1998). Today his collection is located and can be viewed at the Zwinger Palace in Dresden. 
http://www.skd.museum/en/museums-institutions/zwinger-with-semperbau/porzellansammlung/ (viewed 12/24/13). MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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far as the nearest border (a relatively short distance) to escape his jurisdiction. Initially Augustus managed 
to keep all the essential knowledge in the head of one man (N = 1) whose movements he could control by 
force. Subsequently he split the knowledge of porcelain paste and glaze between two individuals. In doing 
so, Augustus modularized knowledge about the porcelain-making process. Applying Equation (8) above, 
note that the move from one agent and one module, N = M = 1, to two agents and two modules N = M = 2 
potentially reduced total payments under the relational contract because the two modules were highly 
complementary: glazed porcelain products were much more valuable than either unglazed porcelain or 
glazed pottery. (The value of doing nothing and of licensing were unchanged.) 
Radial Tires 
Moving into the 20
th Century, Liebeskind (1997) describes a similar split of production processes 
and knowledge related to making radial tires:  
During the 1960s, Michelin had a monopoly on knowledge relating to the production of high 
quality steel-belted radial tire manufacturing. In order to preserve this monopoly, manufacturing 
was divided into two separate processes: steel belt manufacturing, and tire production. Employees 
were not rotated between these manufacturing processes in a deliberate effort to restrict the 
number of employees that had knowledge about both processes. As a result, only a handful of 
very senior managers within Michelin were knowledgeable about the entire manufacturing 
process. (p. 645). 
 
Practices in Emerging Economies 
Emerging economies are an interesting source of examples for us because intellectual property rights 
are generally not well protected in these settings. As a result, the actions managers take to protect 
organizational secrets are more stark and visible.  
Based on 120 interviews conducted in Brazil and Mexico in the 1980s, Sherwood (1990) reports that 
the following tactics were used to discourage the “predatory hiring” by competitors of employees with 
valuable knowledge: (1) Access to corporate technology was limited to family members or trusted 
employees. (2) Attractive housing was offered to key technical employees. (3) Critical technologies were 
worked on only by expatriate employees who had long-term career paths with the international parent 
firm. (4) New hires were exposed to only a small part of the overall operation and left in that role for MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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several years, until they were viewed as trustworthy. (5) The founder alone knew the whole process, but a 
few life-long employees were permitted to know discrete parts. Note that practice (1) makes use of clans; 
(2) and (3) are forms of relational contracting; and (4) and (5) combine screening with modularity. 
In a large sample study, Zhao (2006) looked at how modularity and complementarity were used to 
protect the value of multinational companies’ R&D across international boundaries. To protect the value 
of their R&D, she argues, multinationals are likely to assign projects with little stand-alone value to R&D 
units in countries with weak IP protection. She goes on to present evidence from citation patterns that 
patents obtained by multinational subsidiaries in countries with weak IP rights have more value in 
conjunction with patents owned by the parent company than with patents owned by third parties. 
Relatedly, in a series of case studies and interviews, Quan and Chesbrough (2010) found that 
multinational managers located projects with little stand-alone value in China because of concerns about 
weak IP protection in that country. The fact that the projects had little stand-alone value reduced defection 
rewards, hence the salaries needed to keep employees loyal. The multinationals could thus take advantage 
of the lower cost of conducting research in China without compromising the returns on their R&D 
investments. 
IBM System/360 
In general, our theoretical results indicate that modularity can be used to reduce the cost and/or risk 
of agents’ expropriating valuable IP. How can these results be reconciled with the example of 
System/360, cited in the introduction, where modularization appeared to trigger a large number of 
employee defections with concomitant loss of IP? The answer to this conundrum is twofold.  
First, the example does not fulfill our assumption that the principal only sells whole systems, or 
keeps third parties in other ways from attaching their modules to his system. Rather, to provide customers 
with configuration options, IBM sold its modules separately, providing modularity in use. This policy 
enabled its customers to integrate modules acquired from third parties into IBM systems. Thus, imitators 
could compete at the module level, without offering whole systems: the configurable system offered MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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points of attachment for such third-party modules (Fixson and Park, 2008). Furthermore, IBM could be 
counted on to maintain a price umbrella over all System/360 modules: it was not going to slash prices to 
drive out small competitors (Christensen, 1993). In contrast, Augustus of Saxony did not sell unglazed 
porcelain, nor did he offer the service to glaze porcelain made by others. Also in the examples of 
Michelin and R&D in emerging economies, the principal did not offer individual modules.  
Second, modularization can sometimes affect a system’s value in ways that are unrelated to the 
protection of IP, but rather emerge from the option value associated with mixing and matching modules 
(Matutes and Regibeau, 1988; Baldwin and Clark, 2000). As the first “truly modular” computer 
(Ferguson and Morris, 1993), System/360 offered this possibility. Largely because of the options it gave 
to customers, System/360 was also a huge market success (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). A very high V 
meant that payments to knowledgeable agents necessary to prevent defection would have increased 
dramatically after System/360 was introduced and its success was apparent. 
Defections from IBM started a few months after the launch of System/360. Interestingly, the first 
defectors had the characteristics of a clan: twelve individuals from the San Jose research lab left as a 
group to form a new company. Their former colleagues dubbed them the “dirty dozen.” In the next five 
years, a significant number of IBM engineers, including some of the most creative and influential, left the 
company to join firms that were in direct competition with IBM (Pugh et al., 1991).  
These defections can be understood as a response to the disequilibrium caused by a value-increasing 
modularization of very large proportions. As indicated, System/360’s value as a product line was far 
greater than any of IBM’s previous systems.
17  The disk and tape drive modules were only a subset of the 
system, but the cost of entering these markets was relatively low. Seventeen firms quickly entered the 
new market for “plug-compatible peripherals” (Transamerica vs. IBM, 698 F.2d 1377). Thus suddenly, 
                                                      
 
17 In 1964, before System/360 was announced, IBM sold six separate computer systems. The average value tied up in each 
system was about $18 billion in today’s dollars. At the end of 1967, the company’s entire market value ($240 billion in today’s 
dollars) was attributable to System/360 alone. (Baldwin and Clark, 2000.) MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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“people with knowledge of IBM technology and business plans [were] worth more outside the company 
… than inside” (Pugh et. al., 1991, p. 491). The result was “defections en masse” (ibid. p. 490). 
Could IBM have prevented these defections? According to our model, it could have changed the 
relational contract to match the (perceived) defection rewards. However, such actions were anathema to 
IBM’s senior executives at the time: they did not think in terms of defection rewards and agent payments, 
but in terms of trust and loyalty to the company. In the short run, IBM’s managers elected to do nothing, 
and simply let the defectors go. It appears plausible that anticipatory licensing or an appropriate increase 
in loyalty payments, in line with our model, would have been advantageous to IBM.  
CONCLUSION 
A principal who derives rents from exclusive knowledge faces the threat of expropriation by agents. 
In this paper, we investigated the impact of modularity on intellectual property protection by formally 
modeling the threat of expropriation by agents. In our model, the principal has three options to address 
this threat: doing nothing, licensing the focal IP ex ante, and paying agents (via a relational contract) to 
prevent their defection. We showed that the principal can influence the value of these options by 
modularizing the technical system and by hiring clans of agents, thus exploiting relationships among 
them. His optimal choice depends on a number of external parameters—the percentage of trustworthy 
agents in the population, the intensity of competition in duopoly, and the degree of complementarity in 
the system. Extensions of the model can be used to understand the effects of screening and signaling in 
the hiring process, legal protection of intellectual property, imitation and substitution, disequilibrating 
changes in the value of knowledge, and social norms of fairness. We also presented examples to show 
how managers arrive at a strategy in practice. 
We contribute to the theory of profiting from innovation in three ways. First, we show how the 
innovator’s best choice of action against expropriation by agents—doing nothing, licensing, or paying 
agents—derives from the characteristics of the focal system, i.e., the number of agents, the share of 
trustworthy agents, the intensity of competition, the size of clans, the number of modules, and the degree MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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of complementarity.  We go beyond earlier work (Rønde, 2001; Rajan and Zingales, 2001) in considering 
a mixed population of trustworthy and untrustworthy agents. Heterogeneity in individual trustworthiness 
makes “doing nothing” a potentially attractive option and our model allows us to predict when it will be 
optimal. Furthermore, it links our analysis to the literature on screening and signaling, with the finding 
that imperfect screening has an effect only if the principal’s best option, with screening, is to do nothing. 
Second, we extend existing work by showing how the innovator can use clans and modularity to increase 
his profits. We thus qualify the finding of earlier authors that modularity poses a risk to value 
appropriation (Rivkin, 2000; Pil and Cohen, 2006; Ethiraj, Levinthal, and Roy, 2008). Importantly, we 
carve out the distinction between modularity in use, which facilitates imitation and substitution, and 
modularity in production, which protects against expropriation by agents. If a system designer manages to 
achieve the latter while preventing the former, or can protect system interfaces from being used by third 
parties, then modularity should work to enhance value appropriation. We also show how clans and the 
modular architecture of the system interact to either reinforce or cancel each other. This interaction 
implies that an analysis of modularity alone will be misleading if clans are present in the focal 
organization. Third, we show how social relationships and norms of fairness affect the normative 
implications of an analysis based on rational choice theory. Since perceived fairness impacts an agent’s 
behavior particularly strongly when trustworthiness matters, some of the recommendations of rational 
choice theory would yield the opposite of the intended outcome if not seen in the relevant social context. 
Although the details determining the best strategies are complex, the implications for managers are 
relatively straightforward. The fundamental choices are (1) to protect the knowledge or not; and (2) to 
trust the agents or not. Relational contracts, that is, paying selected agents not to defect, makes it possible 
to protect knowledge and maintain a monopoly when agents are relatively untrustworthy. Clans, 
modularity, complementarity, and a legal system all serve to lower the cost and increase the value of this 
strategy. Trusting one’s agents—what we have called “doing nothing”—is the most valuable course of 
action if it works, but is a risky strategy because trust can always be betrayed. Better screening and MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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signaling technologies make it easier for the principal to trust his agents, but some residual risk always 
remains.  
Our model has a number of limitations. Most importantly, we have presented agent payments and 
trust as stark alternatives. However, given norms of fairness and reciprocity, the boundary between these 
strategies tends to blur. Specifically, trustworthy agents may expect “fair” treatment from the principal, 
where “fair” entails some sharing of the value of the enterprise. In effect, t may be an implicit function of 
the agent payment parameter  . Then in an abstract sense, the principal’s problem will be to determine a 
feasible and effective combination of t and  . It is certainly possible to set up a model of this type, but 
the t() function, if it exists, is not one we know much about. 
Lastly, there are three potential routes to testing the model. The first is to conduct surveys and 
interviews, as in Sherwood (1990) and Poppo and Zenger (2002). These can determine whether some of 
the basic correlations predicted by the model, for example, a switch from agent payments to doing 
nothing as the perceived trustworthiness of employees increases, are observed in cross-section. However, 
such tests will be hampered by the fact that there is no guaranty of consistency in the perceptions of 
managers in different firms and countries. A second approach is to conduct case studies of events such as 
the introduction of System/360. However such events are rare and generally subject to multiple causal 
explanations. Finally, laboratory experiments can be used to test whether differences in t, , or N lead to 
strategy choices consistent with the model’s predictions. In other words, using intuitive reasoning alone, 
do individuals make choices that are consistent with the predictions of the model? And what, if any, role 
do norms of fairness and reciprocity play in determining their choices? The most promising route we 
think involves a combination of surveys, interviews and lab experiments to determine how managers 
reason practically about protecting organizational secrets. MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The proof of Proposition 1(a) follows from straightforward calculation. Since 1/N > 0 and since 
 / 1    increases in , also   / 1     /  increases in . Since  < ½  we have /(1-) < 1. Thus 
  / 1      is decreasing in x (for any x > 0) and   / 1     /  is increasing in N. This proves part 
(b) of the proposition.  
Proof of Proposition 2 
Part (a) follows from the argument in the main text. Part (b) is shown by equating the respective 
payoff terms (e.g., Πpayments  Π nothing) and solving for N and t, respectively. For part (c), the derivatives 
are after some algebraic manipulation: 
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          .   (A-1) 
Since t
* is only defined for N α     1 , the terms in square brackets are positive. It follows directly 
that the first derivative is negative. For the second derivative, note that ln(1+x) < x for x > 0 (since 
ln(1)=0, ln’(1)=1, and ln’’(x) <0 for all x). It follows that the term in curly brackets is positive, and hence 
the derivative overall negative.   
Proof of Proposition 3 
We rewrite Equation 1 as:  
 
Πnothing          1      .
 
(A-2) 
Given that  1, if 0 < t < 1 then t
N (1 – ) decreases with N; otherwise it remains unchanged. Thus 
nothing decreases in N (or remains unchanged if t=0 or t=1). For From Equation 3, it is clear that payment 
decreases in N if  > 0 and remains unchanged otherwise. licensing, finally, does not depend on N. MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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Proof of Proposition 4 
(a) We first consider how the values of doing nothing and of paying agents vary with M. We assume, 
as stipulated in the Proposition, that 0 < t < 1. 
Doing nothing: In the modular system, the value of doing nothing equals the expected value of each 
module times the number of modules plus the incremental value of the system. Thus we can write the 
value of the do-nothing strategy for the modular system as: 
   Πnothing,mod  	 1   	    ,     	  	       ,    ,  (A-3) 
where g(t,) is the expected value of the M modules and h(t,) is the corresponding expected system-
level value.  
Using Equation 1 in the text and the symmetry of modules, we have: 
     ,    	   /      1    /   	  (A-4) 
Note that    ,   increases in M (as long as 0 < t < 1). 
Turning to the second term in square brackets, we have: 
     ,    	  1           	  ,  (A-5) 
where p denotes the probability that someone is untrustworthy in every module. The probability that at 
least one agent is untrustworthy in any module is 1t
N/M  , thus:  
      1    /  
 
. (A-5) 
Note that     1    /  
 
 decreases in M in two respects: increasing M in the ratio  /  increases 
  /  and thus decreases the overall expression; and increasing M in the external exponent decreases p 
because the term in brackets is between zero and one. Since p decreases in M,    ,   increases in M 
(again as long as 0 < t < 1). 
If M > 1, then t
N/M  t
N and thus Πnothing      ,  . Furthermore, by Equation A-5,   1    / , 
thus 1      /  and    ,        ,  . Using the inequalities, we have: MODULARITY AND IP PROTECTION 
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  Πnothing	 	   ,  	 	 1      ,          ,  	 	Πnothing,mod .  (A-6) 
Furthermore, we have seen that both    ,   and    ,   are increasing in M, thus, within the stipulated 
range, Πnothing,mod	also increases with M.  
Paying agents: From Equation 8 the necessary payment to keep each agent loyal is: 
  Necessary payment per agent =   1         	  /                         (A-7) 
The necessary payment is less than    if M > 1. Because p and 1/M are both decreasing in M, the 
necessary payment is likewise decreasing in the number of modules. Thus modularization unambiguously 
increases the value of this strategy. 
(b) We next consider how the values of doing nothing and of paying agents vary with  .  
Doing Nothing: We can rewrite (A-3) as: 
  Πnothing,mod  	     ,         ,        ,    .  (A-8) 
Since    ,        ,  , it follows immediately that Πnothing,mod	increases with  .  
Paying agents: It follows directly from (A-7) that, unless   1 , the necessary payment is strictly 
decreasing in  . 
(c) Licensing: If the principal licenses all modules, he will get αV in total. Thus modularization 
does not change the value of licensing. 
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FIGURE 
Figure 1. The principal’s best option as a function of parameters t and  
 
 